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find himself. This leaves the police officer to decide in situations
where even judges and attorneys may not agree. Yet, if the
"hindsight" of the judiciary disagrees with the officer, he is liable.
Although courts may say that they try to consider the situation
from the point of view of the officer, this does not alter the fact
that the officer must act first with the judge deciding later
whether the officer's conduct was constitutionally proper.
It is submitted that it is unfair to require policemen to
evaluate the constitutionality of their conduct except in the
most obvious situations, as for example, beating a confession from
an accused. The test of willful violation of constitutional rights
should be required for findings of personal liability. For situations involving "honest or good faith" violations of constitutional
safeguards liability on the employing agency itself would provide
an adequate remedy. Expenses incurred for violations of individual rights due to honest mistakes of police officers is certainly
a legitimate cost of law enforcement. Society will be paying for
its own errors. This will allow the vigorous law enforcement
officer freedom to act quickly without fear of financial reprisal
for his honest attempts to enforce the law.
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.

INSANITY-THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Article 652 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
establishes the procedural rule that an accused who claims insanity as a defense has the burden of proving his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence. This rule is followed in twentyfour states.1 However, in the rest of the states 2 and in federal
1. These are: Alabama, Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 142 So.2d 899 (1962);
Alaska, Bowker v. State, 373 P.2d 500 (1962); Arkansas, Kelley v. State, 154
Ark. 246, 242 S.W. 572 (1922); California, People v. Monk, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633,
363 P.2d 865 (1961); Delaware, Longoria v. State, 53 Del. 311, 168 A.2d 695
(1961); Georgia, Ross v. State, 217 Ga. 569, 124 S.E.2d 280 (1962); Iowa, State
v. Drosos, 253 Iowa 1152, 114 N.W.2d 526 (1962); Kentucky, Tungent v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785 (1947); Maine, State v. Park, 159 Me.
328, 193 A.2d 1 (1963); Minnesota, State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d
508 (1960); Missouri, State v. King, 375 S.W.2d 34 (1964); Montana, State v.
DeHann, 88 Mont. 407, 292 P. 1109 (1930); Nevada, State v. Behiter, 55 Nev.
236, 29 P.2d 1000 (1934); New Jersey, State v. Kudzinowski, 106 N.J.L. 155,
147 A. 453 (1929); North Carolina, State v. Swink, 229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E.2d 852
(1948); Ohio, State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439 (1964);
Oregon, 14 ORE. REV. STAT. 136.390 (1960); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v.

Upedgrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A.2d 534 (1964); Rhode Island, State v. Gunnites,
91 R.I. 209, 161 A.2d 818 (1960); South Carolina, State v. Tidwell, 100 S.C.
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court, the accused need only show some evidence of his insanity.
The prosecution must then prove his sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Leland v. Oregons it. seems that the Louisiana rule is not unconstitutional, but this decision was reached more than fifteen
years ago. The law in the area of criminal procedure has undergone tremendous change in the ensuing period of time. 4 The
purpose of this Comment is to consider not only the constitutional questions, but also to examine the fairness and logical consistency of Louisiana's rule.
Procedure in Louisiana
The Louisiana procedure is stated clearly in the Code of
Criminal Procedure: "The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence." 5 This rule has been established for
many years in the jurisprudence, with State v. Scott6 being the
248, 84 S.E. 778 (1915); Texas, Carrell v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 50, 283 S.W.2d
793 (1951); Virginia, Christian v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 311, 117 S.E.2d 72
(1960); Washington, State v. Mays, 65 Wash.2d 58, P.2d 758 (1965); West
Virginia, State v. McCauley, 130 W.Va. 401, 43 S.E.2d 454 (1947). See 17
A.L.R.3d 146 (1968).
2. Those states following the federal rule are: Arizona, State v.
Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521 (1965); Colorado, Castro v. People, 140 Colo.
493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); Connecticut, State v. Joseph, 96 Conn. 637, 115 A. 85
(1921); Florida, Farrell v. State, 101 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1958); Hawaii, State v.
Moeller, 50 Hawaii 110, 433 P.2d 136 (1967); Idaho, State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho
322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); Illinois, People v. Robinson, 22 Ill.2d 162, 174 N.E.2d
820 (1961); Indiana, Whitaker v. State, 240 Ind. 676, 168 N.E.2d 212 (1960);
Kansas, State v. Penry, 189 Kan. 243, 368 P.2d 60 (1962); Maryland, Jenkins
v. State, 238 Md. 451, 209 P.2d 616 (1965); Massachusetts, Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967); Michigan, People v. Eggleston,
186 Mich. 510, 152 N.W. 944 (1915); Mississippi, McGarrh v. State, 249 Miss.
247, 148 So.2d 494 (1963); Nebraska, Thompson v. State, 159 Neb. 685, 68
N.W.2d 267 (1955); North Dakota, State v. Barry, 11 N.D. 428, 92 N.W. 809
.(1902); New Hampshire, State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224 (1861); New Mexico,
7State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936); New York, People v. Kelley,
302 N.Y. 512, 99 N.E.2d 552 (1951); Oklahoma, Whisenhunt v. State, 430 Okla.
Crim. 407, 279 P.2d 366 (1954); South Dakota, State v. Waugh, 80 S.D. 503,
127 N.W.2d 429 (1964); Tennessee, Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W.
327 (1911); Utah, State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 40 P.2d 961 (1935); Wisconsin,
State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 67, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962); Wyoming, State v.
Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 P. 806 (1907). The District of Columbia also follows
this rule: Jones v. United States, 284 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See 17
A.L.R.3d 146 (1968).
3. 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The United States Supreme Court held an Oregon
statute not unconstitutional which forced the accused to prove his insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
4. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bruton v. United States,
389 U.S. 818 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v.
Wainrlght, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Art. 652.
6. 49 La. Ann. 253, 21 So. 271 (1897). See also State v. Stewart, 238 La.
1036, 117 So.2d 583 (1960); State v. Chinn, 229 La. 983, 87 So.2d 315 (1955).
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leading case. An earlier case adopted an even harsher rule in
which the accused had to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, 7 but it was not followed and was not adopted in the
present Code of Criminal Procedure.
An interesting question arises in connection with the Louisiana rule when the jury finds that the accused has failed to meet
his burden of proof but nevertheless has a reasonable doubt as
to the legal sanity of the accused. Ordinarily one would suppose
that when the state has failed to prove every element beyond a
reasonable doubt, acquittal would follow. This, however, is not
the result in Louisiana. In State v. Surrency8 the court considered on appeal the following instructions to the jury:
"If on the whole testimony, and giving to the presumption
of sanity its full operation, you are satisfied the accused
was insane when the act was committed, you should acquit.
It is sufficient if the evidence on this point raises a reasonable
doubt to acquit."9
This instruction was found to be erroneous, and the court concluded that the proper instructions in the circumstance should
be:
"If, on the whole, considering all of the evidence as to his
mental condition, there is a preponderance of proof in favor
of insanity of a character to render the defendant irresponsible, then the accused should be acquitted; if not and the
proof otherwise convinces the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he should be convicted."' 0 (Emphasis added.)
Two notions that serve to buttress this procedure are the
presumption of sanity and the idea that sanity is not an element
of the crime and therefore need not be proved." The effect of the
presumption of sanity is to force the accused to prove his insanity
if he is to succeed in his defense. Insanity is considered to be an
"affirmative defense," and this defense must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. The other factor used to defend
the Louisiana rule and the only possible way of justifying the
decision in the Surrency 2 case is that sanity is not an element of
7. State v. DeRanc6, 34 La. Ann. 186 (1882).
8. 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240 (1921).
9. Id. at 993, 88 So. at 243.
10. Id. at 994, 88 So. at 244.
11. Note, 20 LA. L. REV. 749 (1960). This Note is cited by the reporter of
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 652, comment (a).
12. 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240 (1921).
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the crime and therefore need not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. One writer has suggested that criminal intent deals with
the question of whether the defendant actively desired (specific
intent) or could have been expected to know (general intent)
that certain consequences would follow from his act, whereas the
question of sanity is concerned with whether the accused should
be held responsible for his act and whether he knew his conduct
to be wrong. 13
In explanation and justification of the Louisiana rule emphasis has been placed on the practicality of the procedure. It has
been suggested that the state should not be forced to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt since the burden would be too great in
having to prove "something which is not usually susceptible of
such conclusive proof, especially where the insanity is not continuing. '14 Proponents of this position also note that the defendant is in a much better position to prove insanity than the state
15
is to prove sanity.
Procedure in Other Jurisdictions
There are two additional procedural methods that have been
used in other jurisdictions when the defendant pleads insanity.
The first of these is similar to the Louisiana rule except that the
accused must prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the fact that this rule places an unusually heavy burden on
the accused it was used in Oregon for almost one hundred years. 16
Fortunately it is no longer the law in any United States jurisdiction. It was apparently reasoned that since the state had to
rebut the presentation of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt,
the accused who claimed insanity would also have to rebut the
presumption of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule was
held constitutional in Leland v. Oregon, 7 but it is clearly an
unfair burden to place upon the accused and directly contrary to
the notion that the state is charged with proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent to Leland
made it perfectly clear that he felt such a procedural rule was in
conflict with the due process requirements of the Constitution. 8
13. Note, 20 LA. L. Rev. 749, 752 (1960).
14. Id. at 751. This same idea is expressed in Bennett, CriminalLaw and
Procedure, 21 LA. L. REv. 366, 367-68 (1961)).
15. Note, 20 LA. L. REv. 749, 752 (1960).

16. This statute has been repealed and Oregon now operates under the
same rule as Louisiana. See 14 ORE. REV. STAT. 136.390 (1960).
17. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
18. Id. at 802-03.
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Another procedural rule is used in the federal courts and in
about one-half of the states. Briefly stated, it is that if upon the
whole evidence there is reasonable doubt of the defendant's
sanity, he should be acquitted. This procedure was set forth in
Davis v. United States19 in an opinion written by the late
Justice Harlan. The principal basis for this view is that the due
process clause requires the defendant to prove nothing and
places upon the state the burden of proving all the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Under this rule the defendant is in no way forced to prove his innocence. This is as it
should be since traditionally the state must prove the guilt of the
defendant. Thus when sanity is put at issue the prosecution
must prove it like every other element of the crime, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The presumption of sanity is by no means discarded under
this rule. It serves a very practical purpose in that it protects
the prosecution from being forced to prove sanity in every case.
If the defendant does not raise the issue of his sanity, he is presumed to be sane, and the issue of sanity is not considered. But
should the accused raise the defense of insanity, he must proceed,
according to Davis, to show "some evidence" of insanity. Thus
there is a burden to raise some evidence, but there is no necessity
to meet any burden of persuasion as is required under the
Louisiana rule. In defining "some evidence" the cases reveal that
the accused must present more than a mere scintilla 2' and do
2s
more than raise the issue of sanity. 22 In Tatum v. United States,
the court found that the defendant's lack of memory plus testimony to the effect that the defendant was abnormal was sufficient
to put the question of sanity at issue.2 4 Such decisions demonstrate that the question of "some evidence" must be decided on a
case by case basis.
The whole concept
and consistency with
defendant is free from
Davis case this notion

of this federal rule is based on fairness
the constitutional principle that the
any burden of proof. At the close of the
is succinctly stated:

19. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
20. Id. at 488. Justice Harlan explains this rule in the Davis case: "If
the whole evidence, including that supplied by the presumption of sanity,
does not exclude beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of
which some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal of the
specific offense charged."
21. E.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
22. Smith v. United States, 353 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23. 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
24. Id. at 615.
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"No man should be deprived of his life under the forms
of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their
consciences, to say that the evidence before them, by whomsoever adduced, is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime charged." 2 5 (Emphasis added.)
The Louisiana Rule-An Analysis
The Louisiana rule runs afoul of two concepts which are
basic to criminal procedure: the presumption of innocence of
the accused and the burden of the prosecution to prove all
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Code of Criminal Procedure adopts the rule that
''a person accused of crime is presumed by law to be innocent
until his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 2 The
presumption of innocence, as explained by Wigmore, implies
"[T]hat the accused .

.

. may remain inactive and secure, until

the prosecution has taken up its burden and produced evidence ....
1"7 Yet in Louisiana if the accused pleads insanity
he cannot remain inactive but must prove his defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. This is an improper shifting
of the burden of proof to the accused and is contrary to the
presumption of innocence.
The federal rule avoids this result. This can be explained
by the fact there are two components of the burden of proof.
First there is the duty of producing evidence, and additionally
there is the burden of persuasion. 28 Under the federal rule the
accused must merely present some evidence of his insanity;
he is not forced to prove anything, and thus there is no improper
shifting of the burden of proof. However, in Louisiana, the
accused bears the burden of persuasion, since he must prove his
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Another example of the inconsistency of the Louisiana rule
arises in connection with the rule that the state must prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute defendant's guilt.

'29

As has been noted from

25. 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895).
26. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 804A.
27. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 2511 (3d ed. 1940).
28. Id. § 2489.
29. LA. R.S. 15:271 (1950). The Louisiana Criminal Code indicates that
there are three elements which must be shown before the accused is held
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an examination of the cases, the courts will instruct the jury
that despite the fact that there may be a reasonable doubt of
defendant's sanity, if the latter fails to prove his insanity by
a preponderance of the evidence he must be determined sane.80

This is the most glaring shortcoming of the Louisiana rule and
is severely criticized by McCormick.
"Thus it seems inconsistent to demand as to some elements
of guilt, such as an act of killing, that the jury be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and as to others, such
as duress or capacity to know right from wrong, the jury
may convict though they have such doubt.""' (Emphasis
added.)
The inconsistency between the Louisiana rule concerning
presumption of innocence and the principle that the state must
prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt raises
the question of the constitutionality of the Louisiana procedure.
The United States Supreme Court dealt with a rule analogous
to the Louisiana rule in Leland v. Oregon,3 2 in which the court
upheld an Oregon statute that required the defendant to prove
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that there
was no denial of due process merely because there might be
some fairer method of dealing with the defendant. The majority
opinion concluded: "We are therefore reluctant to interfere with
Oregon's determination of its policy with respect to the burden
of proof on the issue of insanity since we cannot say that policy
violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of
justice." 83
Justice Frankfurter, in his vigorous dissent, reacted strongly
to the majority opinion and pointed out several shortcomings
of its reasoning. He felt that the Oregon statute went too far
in attempting to penalize those persons who commit crimes by
criminally responsible. Article 8(1) explains that an act or failure to act
plus criminal intent is necessary to produce criminal conduct. Article 14

explains that one will not be held criminally responsible for his acts if he
Is insane. Thus act, intent, and sanity must be established to prove guilt.
LA. R.S. 14:8, 14.
30. E.g., State v. Surrency, 148 La. 983, 88 So. 240 (1921). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
31. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 321 (2d ed. 1954).
Additionally McCormick notes that the recent trend in both the English and

American courts is to follow the rule used by the federal courts. Id.
32. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
33. Id. at 799.
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casting upon them the burden of proving their defense.3 4 He
argued that since insanity is an unusual situation, the courts
may take unusual measures in dealing with it. He accepted the
presumption of sanity and agreed that the defendant should
have the duty of raising the defense of insanity. But he did
not feel that the accused should be forced to meet any such
burden of proof.
It has been widely accepted as a cornerstone of criminal
justice that the accused is presumed innocent and that the
prosecution is burdened with proving all elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 5 Spieser v. Randall0 implies that
it is a constitutional requirement that the defendant be free
of any burden of proof: "Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the government has borne the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the fact finder
of his guilt. '3 7 A recent holding by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reinforces the Spieser decision.
Stump v. Bennett 3s held that the procedural rule requiring the
defendant to prove his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence
fell short of the minimal standards of fairness and constituted
denial of fourteenth amendment rights. The Stump decision,
however, left open the question of whether the presumption
of innocence is of constitutional status.30 But the court did
say: "[T]his much is clear: when the burden of persuasion is
shifted to the defendant to disprove essential elements of a
crime, as it was in the instant case, then it is certain that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
34. Id. at 802: "[Tlhe conception of justice which has dominated our
criminal law refused to put an accused at the hazard of punishment if he
fails to remove every reasonable doubt of his innocence in the minds of the
jurors. It is the duty of the government to establish his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."
35. This notion is pointed out in Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456,
471 (1961): "One of the rightful boasts of western Civilization is that the
. . . [prosecution] . . . has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the
basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring an
accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure." See also Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); and Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 93 (1934):
"In such circumstances the conviction of Morrison because he failed to
assume the burden of disproving a conspiracy was a denial of due process
that vitiates the judgment as to him."
36. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
37. Id. at 526.
38. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968).
39. Cf. 398 F.2d 111, 118 (8th Cir. 1968). The court actually questioned
the validity of the Leland decision on this point. In Leland the Supreme
Court seemed to deny constitutional status to the presumption of innocence.
This apparent denial was accomplished through the court's treatment of the
Davis case.
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violated. '40 This statement is in direct conflict with the Leland
decision since in Leland the accused was faced with a burden
of proof, and the prosecution was relieved of its responsibility
of proving all elements of the crime. It matters not that one
might say that sanity is not an issue to be proved by the prosecution. When the presumption of sanity is put at issue, it is
in reality impossible to prove intent without first proving sanity.
Thus the state would be required to prove sanity, like all other
elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken directly
4
on the Stump decision, but the Court in Johnson v. Bennett '
vacated and remanded an Eighth Circuit ruling which had
upheld the constitutionality of an identical Iowa statute. The
Supreme Court's action came after the circuit court had reversed
itself and in Stump ruled the statute unconstitutional. It is
notable that the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to
reconsider the Johnson case in light of its later decision that
the statute was unconstitutional.
The rule of procedure in Louisiana is certainly contrary
to the constitutional requirements expressed in Stump. In State
v. Surrency 42 the court noted that if the defendant failed to
establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, the
defense of insanity would fail despite the fact that there might
be a reasonable doubt as to his sanity. This is clearly in opposition to the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as is explicitly noted in the Stump decision. 43
There are other problems raised with reference to the
Louisiana rule.44 For instance, it is questionable if the great
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 118.
393 U.S. 253 (1968).
148 La. 93, 88 So. 240 (1921).
There is the additional question of whether forcing the accused to

prove his insanity is a violation of the fifth amendment of the United States

Constitution. This area is outside the scope of this Comment, but it is suggested that the Louisiana rule might also violate the fifth amendment.
Circumstances can be easily imagined in which the accused would have no

one to testify to his insanity (e.g., he is an indigent and cannot afford
medical examinations and medical witnesses) at the time of the crime.
Without such testimony defendant would be compelled to take the stand in
order to offer proof of his insanity. This would be particularly damaging in
light of Louisiana's broad rule on cross examination. See LA. R.S. 15:376
(1950).
44. Another related area that causes much difficulty is the fact the
Louisiana courts refuse to allow any mental defect short of legal insanity to

negate specific intent. State v. Rideau, 249 La. 1111, 193 So.2d 264 (1967). This
area is outside the scope of this Comment. However, see generally Comment,
22 LA. L. REv. 664 (1962).
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importance placed on the presumption of sanity is justified.
First it is necessary to examine the validity of the presumption that all men are sane. Generally, a presumption must meet
the test of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
that there be a rational relation or connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed and that the presumption must not be arbitrary. 45 The limit concerning presumptions established by the legislature is stated in United
48
States v. Tot:
"But where the inference is so strained as not to have a
reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know
them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as
a rule governing the procedure of the courts." 47
It is clear that the presumption of sanity is certainly not
arbitrary and that from "the circumstances of life as we know
them" it is certainly not unreasonable that men should be presumed sane. However, it is open to the very serious question
of exactly what this presumption should mean as far as the
jury is concerned. Under the Louisiana rule, the presumption
of sanity forces the defendant to carry a burden of persuasion
and prove his innocence. The United States Supreme Court
has been unwilling to allow presumptions to have such force.
The Court has pointed out: "The power to create presumptions
is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions. '4
All of this is not to say that the presumption of sanity
cannot serve a useful purpose. The federal courts and the states
operating under a similar rule use the presumption of sanity
to prevent the prosecution from being forced to prove sanity
in cases where the defense of insanity is not raised. In cases
where the question is raised, sanity must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. This procedure simply places a limited importance on the presumption of sanity.
45. See, e.g., Minski v. United States, 131 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1943).

46. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The presumption involved here was that if one
had a prior conviction of a crime of violence and present possession of a
firearm that it was presumed the weapon was obtained through interstate

or foreign commerce.
47. Id. at 468.
48. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911). Justice Black used this
case as basis for his dissent in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), in
which he noted that as presumptions become more important to litigants
and to the administration of justice, ". . . a more careful scrutiny is necessary." Id. at 78. This dissent was followed by the Court in limiting the
validity of presumptions. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
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Furthermore, it seems exceedingly impractical for the jury
to have to juggle with two burdens of proof in order to determine the question of sanity and the question of guilt or
innocence. The concept of the burden of proof is an extremely
slippery notion that is not easily explained by even the best
legal writers. The jury is ordinarily charged that the state
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is unlikely that this is ever completely understood by the
jurors, much less when they have the additional burden of
finding insanity proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
It is inevitable that confusion and misunderstanding will result.
The comments to the Code of Criminal Procedure 49 emphasize
that the rule is practical, yet it is not nearly so easily understood by the jury as the simple charge that the prosecution
must prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proponents of the present Louisiana rule emphasize that
the "defendant is in a better position to prove insanity than is
the State to prove sanity."' 0 This reasoning is not persuasive,
because the defendant is certainly in no better position to gain
needed medical testimony. One might just as easily say it
would be more "practical" for the accused in any criminal case
to prove he did not commit the crime, than to force upon the
state the burden of proof. Mere practicality should not prevail
when the procedures are offensive to our notions of justice and
fair play.
Although it is not generally stated in the opinions of the
courts, proponents of the Louisiana rule suggest that underlying
it is the notion that it is simply too great a burden for any
party, either defendant or prosecution, to prove insanity or
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.51 While this might be a
valid argument it must be noted that the federal courts have
been operating under the Davis rule since 1895 and have not
found it unmanageable. The same can be said for the twentyfour state courts that follow the same rule. It would seem that
fairness to the accused should outweigh any possible difficulty
of proof that may be associated with the federal rule.
Finally, it is important to note that a great deal of confusion results when rules (such as the Louisiana rule) from
49. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 652, comment (a).
50. Note, 20 LA. L. REv. 749, 752 (1960).
51. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1959-1960 TermCriminal Law and Procedure, 21 LA. L. REv. 366, 367 (1961).
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civil practice are used in criminal law. This problem has been
evident in many jurisdictions because defenses of duress, insanity, self-defense, and alibi are often known as "affirmative
defenses," and when asserted must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence just as an affirmative defense must be
proved in a civil case. This is a typical example of civil procedure terms being used in the criminal law with confusion
resulting. Actually these "affirmative defenses" are misnomers
and should be treated no differently from other defenses in a
criminal prosecution.
Conclusion
The rule followed in Louisiana which forces the accused
to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence is a
denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Con2
sidering the Supreme Court's concern with criminal procedure,
it is not unlikely that the Court will be faced with this question.
The writer suggests that Louisiana should follow the procedure used by the federal courts and avoid this constitutional
problem. By following the federal rule Louisiana would also be
uniform in its dealings with the so-called affirmative defenses.
In both the alibi 53 and self-defense 54 situations the accused is
required to prove nothing, and the state is forced to prove the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This certainly
should be the case with insanity since the situations are fundamentally the same. In addition, the federal rule decreases the
chances of confusion concerning the burden of proof, because
the prosecution is required to prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt; whereas, under the Louisiana rule the jurors
must also consider the accused's burden of proving his insanity.
The foregoing reasons weigh against the continued use of the
present Louisiana rule; but more importantly, the United States
Constitution compels that the rule be changed.
Herschel E. Richard, Jr.
52. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818 (1968); Wade v. United
States, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
53. State v. Ardoin, 49 La. Ann. 1145, 22 So. 620 (1897).
54. State v. Carter, 227 La. 820, 80 So.2d 420 (1955); State v. Conda, 156
La. 679, 101 So. 19 (1924).

